Weekly National Intelligencer.

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Weekly National Intelligencer

BY GALES & SEATON. JAMES C. WELLING, ASSOCIATE EDITOR.

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THE BATTLES ON THE PENINSULA.

The Republican publishes, as "furnished by the Government," the following preliminary report by General McCLELLAN of a portion of the operations of the Army

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. GENERAL: Without waiting to receive the reports of all the subordinate commanders. I submit the following very brief narrative of the operations of this army since the 25th ultimo.

On the 24th of June I received information that appeared entitled to some credit, that Gen. Jackson was at Frederick's Hall with his entire force, consisting of his own division with those of Ewell and Whiting, and that his intention was to attack our right flank and rear, in order intention was to attack our right flank and rear, in order to cut off our communication with the White House, and to threw the right wing of the army into the Chickahominy. Fortunately, I had a few days before provided against this contingency by ordering a number of transports to the James river, loaded with commissary, quartermaster, and ordnance supplies. I therefore felt free to watch the enemy closely, wait events, and act according to

water the enemy closely, wait events, and act according to eircumstances, feeling sure that if cut off from the Pamunkey I could gain the James river for a rear base.

I placed Gen Stoneman in command of the cavalry on the right, entrusting to his charge the picket duty towards Hanover Court house, to give the earliest possible information of an advance of the enemy from that direction.

On the 25th Gen. Heintzelman was directed to drive in the court of th the enemy's pickets from the woods in his front, in order to give us command of the cleared fields still further in advance. This was gallantly and handsomely done under a stubborn resistance, the brunt of the fighting falling upon the division of Hooker. Just as the new line was gained, I was called from the field by intelligence which tend-d strongly to confirm the belief that Jackson was really approaching.

reall, approaching.

I immediat-ly repaired to the camp of General Fi'z I immediately repaired to the camp of General Fi'z John Porter, commanding on the right of the Chickahominy, to obtain further information and arrange the movements for the morrow. On my arrival I found that there was a strong probability of Jackson's advancing, although not a certainty of it. I therefore determined to leave our heavy guns in battery and to retain McCall's division in its strong position on Beaver Dam creek, near Mechanicaville, posting merely small outposts to watch the crossing near Meadow Bridge and Mechanicaville, and to give McCall immediate notice of the enemy's approach. Porter's remaining troops were to be held in reserve, ready to act according to circumstances. The centre and ceady to act according to circumstances. The centre and leit of the a my were also to be held in readiness to repulse any attack, or to move to the assistance of the right.

It had long before been determined to hold the position of Beaver Dam creek in the event of being attacked on

that side, for the reasons that the position was intrinsi-cally a very strong one, was less liable to be turned on either flank than any position is advance of it, and brought the army in a more concentrated and manageable condithe army in a more concentrated and manageaue condi-tion. The natural atrength of the position had been some-what increased by slight rifle-pits and felling a little tumber in front of it; with the exception of epaulments for artil-lery near Gaines's and Hogan's houses, to set against the enemy's batteries on the right bank of the Chickahominy, there were no other artificial defences on the left bank of that stream. Our position on the right bank of the river had been rendered reasonably secure against assault by felling timber and the construction of slight earthworks. Measures had already been taken to secure the passage of

The right wing, under the command of Gen. Fitz John Porter, consisted of the divisions of Morell, Sykes, and McCall, with a large part of the cavalry reserve. He had ten heavy gues in the battery on the banks of the Chicks-

ten heavy gues in the battery on the banks of the Chickshominy.

Such was the state of affairs on the morning of June 26. I was by that time satisfied that I had to deal with at least double my numbers, but so great was my confidence in the conduct of the officers, and the bravery, discipline, and devotion of my men, that I felt contented calmly to await the bursting of the coming storm, ready to profit by any fault of the enemy, and sure that I could extricate the army from any difficulty in which it might become involved. No other course was open to me, for my information in regard to the movements of the enemy was to meagre to cashle me to take a decided course.

I had not long to wait. During the formoon of the 26th the enemy crossed, in several columns, in the vicinity of Mechanicsville and Meadow Bridge, and attacked McCall in his position at Beaver Dam creek. His repeated

Call in his position at Beaver Dam creek. His repeated efforts were constantly repulsed, with but little loss on our side, but with great slaughter on the part of the enemy. The contest ceased here about 9 P. M., the enemy leaving us in full possession of every part of the field of battle. During the action McCall was supported by the brigades of Martindale and Griffin, of the division of Moreil. While this was going on there was some sharp affairs of pickets on the centre and left, but nothing of a serious

By this time I had certain information that Jackson was rapidly a transing, in strong force, from Hanover Court-house, and that his advance guard had probably participated in the battle of Beaver Dam creek. This rendered that position untenable. I therefore determined still furthat position untenable. I therefore determined still further to concentrate the army by withdrawing Porter's command to a position near Gaines's Mill, where he could rest both his flanks on the Chickabominy, and cover the most important bridges over that stream. The wagons and heavy guns were withdrawn during the night, the troops falling back to their new position early in the morning. The enemy attacked Seymour's brigade, constituting the rear guard of the division of McCall, but were sharply

the rear guard of the division of McCall, but were sharply repulsed, and the movement was not further molested.

In the course of the morning of the 27th I received intelligence that Longstreet's corps was at Mcchanicaville, ready to move down on either hank of the Chickshominy, according to circumstances. This intelligence, and many threate ing movements of the enemy on various parts of the centre and left, placed a limit to the amount of the reinforcements available for the support of Portec. Under the circumstances, it was impossible to withdraw him to the right bank of the Chickshominy by daylight. The enemy were so close upon him that the attempt would have insured the less of a large portion of his corps, and, in any event, the abundousment of his position at that time would have placed our right flank and rear at the mercy of the enemy. It was necessary to fight him where we stood, to enemy. It was necessary to fight him where we stood, to hold our position, at any cost, until night, and in the mean time to perfect the arrangements for the change of base to

In the report of Gan Porter will be found a detailed description of the field of battle at Gaines's Mill, and the circumstances of that eventful contest, creditable alike to the energy of the enemy and the desperate valor of the comparatively small band that repelled the attacks of his energous masses. It will suffice, for the purposes of this report, to state that the action commenced about 2 P M, and that during the affector. paratively small band that reperfed the attacks of his elecmous masses. It will suffice, for the purposes of this report, to state that the action commenced about 2 P M, and that during the afterneon I ordered up the division of
Blocum to the support of Porter, and soon after the brigades of French and Mesgher, of R chardson's division.
The latter were not engaged. At a later period two brigades of Peck's division were ordered forward, but, as
their services were not needed, they did not cross the
Chickahominy. The contest continued, with varying fortunes, until dark, when the enemy discontinued his attack
During the night the final withdrawal of the right wing
across the Chickahominy was completed, we thout difficulty
and without confusio, a portion of the regulars resmaining
on the left bank until the morning of the 28th. Early on
that morning the bridges were burned, and the whole
army was thus concentrated on the right bank of the
Chickahominy

During the battle of Gaines's Mill the polition of Gen.
Smith was warmly attached, but the enemy was at once

Smith was warmly attached, but the enemy was at once repulsed with loss.

In the course of the night of the 27th Gen. Keyes was ordered to cross the White Oak Swamp with the Fourth ordered to cross the White Oak Swamp with the Fourth Corps and take up a position to cover the passage of the trains. Measures were also taken to increase the number of bridges across the swamp. The trains were set in metion at an early hour, and continued passing across the swamp, night and day, without intermission, until all had crossed.

On the 28th Porter's corps was also moved across the White Oak Swamp, and on the morning of the 28th took

up a position covering the roads leading from Richmond towards White Oak Swamp and Long Bridges. During he night of the 28th and 29th the divisions of Slocum and McCall were ordered across the White Oak Swamp, and were placed in position to cover the passage of the re-maining divisions and trains. In the course of the same sight the corps of Sumner and Heistzelman and the divi-ion of Smith were ordered to fall back from their original positions to an interior line re-ting upon Keyes's old en-trenchments on the left, and so arranged as to cover Savage Station. They were ordered to hold this position until dark, then to fall back across the swamps and rejoin the test of the army. This order was not fully carried ut, nor was the exact position I designated occupied by suit was that two attacks of the enemy—one a very de-termined onset—were signally repulsed by Sumner's corps, assisted in the last by Smith's division of the sixth corps. These are the two actions known as the affair of Allen's Field and the battle of Savage Station. The third corps crossed the swamp before dark, having left its position before the hour assigned, and was not in action during that day, (the 29th.) The second corps and Smith's division safely crossed the swamp during the night with all their guns and material, and brought up the rear of the ways of train.

Vagon train.

In the night of the 29th and 30th the four h and fifth corps were ordered to move to James river, to rest on that river at or near Turkey bend, and occupy a position perpendicular to the river, thus covering the Charles City road to Richmond, opening communication with the gunboats, and covering the wegen train, which was pushed as rapidly as possible upon Haxali's and Harrison's plantations. he remaining corps were moved in the same direction and posted so as to cover the main roads leading from Richmond as well as the crossings by which the army had passed the White Oak Swamp, and to guard the passage of our large trains to the James river.

of our large trains to the James river.

When the troops were in position in the afternoon, before the enemy attacked, they were posted about as follows:
Prter, with two divisions, (Morell's and Sykes's) and the mass of the reserve s tillery on Malvern Hill, (the left of the position;) next Couch, with one brigade of Peck's division in reserve; next Sedgwick; then McCall, Hooker, Kearny, Slocum, Naglee's brigade, Richartson, and Smith. During the actions which ensued at Turkey Bridge, on the New Market road, (Glendale,) and at White Oak Swamp

changes were made in this disposition.

The result of the various actions of the 30th, during The result of the various actions of the 30th, during which our whole line was attacked, was that the en-my was every where repulsed, except in his attack upon McCali's division, which, hard pressed by greatly superior numbers, and having lost three of its general officers, broke and lost most of its artillery. The gal ant conduct of their comrades near by, especially Hooker's division, retrieved that mishap and renered it impossible for the enemy to reap any advantages from it.

By this time the last of the trains had reached Haxall's Landing, and during the night the trains had reached to the

Landing, and during the night the troops fell back to the vicinity of that place, all arriving in safety and unmolested placed in position to offer batile to the enemy should be again attack, the left of the line resting on the admirable position of Malvern Hill, with a brigade in the low grount to the left, watching the road to Richmond, the line then ollowing a line of heights nearly parallel to the river, and bending back through the woods nearly to the James river on our right. On the left we relied up n the natural advantages of the position; on the right, where the natural strength was less, some little cutting of timber was done, and the roads blocked. Although our force was small for so extensive a position, it was necessary to hold it at any

When the battle commenced in the afternoon, I saw that in the faces and bearing of the men which satisfied me that we were sure of victory. The attack was made upon our left and left centre, and the brunt of it was borne by Por-ter's corps (including Hunt's reserve artillery and Tyler's beavy guns) and Couch's division, reinforced by the brirades of Sickles and Meagher. It was de-perate, brave, and determined, but so destructive was the fire of our numerous artillery, so heroic the conduct of our infantry, and so admirable the dispositions of Porter, that no troops could have carried the position. Late in the evening the enemy sell back, thoroughly beaten, with dreadful alsughter. So completely was he crushed, and so great were his losses, that he has not since ventured to attack us.

Previous to the battle of Malvern, I had fully consulted with Commodore Rodgers, and with him made a hasty reconnoise acce of the positions of the river. The d fliculty
of passing our transports above City Point was so great
that I determined to fall back upon the position now occupied by the army—a position, too, much less extensive
than tunt of Malvern, and therefore permitting me to give he troops were placed essentially in their present posi

ions.

To the calm judgment of history and the future I leav the tak of pronouncing upon this movement, confidenthat its verdict will be that no such difficult movemen was ever more successfully executed ; that no army ever ought more repeatedly, heroically, and success ully against ouen great odds; that no men of any race ever displayed reater decipline, endurance, patience, and cheeriuleess, and exercipliness.

My mind cannot com expressions of thanks and admi-

ration werm enough or intense enough to do justice to my feelings towards the army I am so proud to command To my countrymen I confidently commit them, convinced they will ever honor every brave man who served during hose seven historic days with the army of the Potomac. Jpon whatever field it may be reafter be called upon to t. I ask that it may never lose its name, but may ever known as the Army of the Potomsc—a name which it

be known as the Army of the Potomac—a name which it never has nor ever will disgrace.

It is not my purpose now to make mention of dating guished services. The names of these who deserve well of their country would swell this report to too great dismensions. I will simply call attention to the invaluable services rendered by the artillery, and say that its performances have fully justified my anticipations, and prove it to be our policy to cherish and increase that arm of the services.

thanks to the gallaut and accomplished Commodore John Rodgers for the valuable assistance rendered the army in Rodgers for the valuable assistance reliefed the acmy invarious ways, but especially by the fire of a portion of the fatility upon the flank of the enemy attacking Malvern Hill on the 30th of June and let of July. Their fire was excellent and produced very beneficial results.

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant, GEO. B MCCLELLAN,

Major General Commanding.
Brig. Gen. L. THOMAS, Adjutant General.

CONNECTICUT ELECTION

The regular election for State officers and members of Congress took place yesterday, after a spirited and earnest campaign. The two t ckets for State officers were as follows Demograt.

Governor....Thos. H. Seymour, Wm A. Buckingham
Lt. Governor...James A. Hovey,
Se'y of State...James H. Hoyt,
Trensurer...A. L. Kidston,
Comptroller...Lloyd C. Baldwin, Leman W. Cut.er.

The names of the candidates of the two parties for Representatives in Congress are se follows- he first two nam.

ed on the Republican side being "War Dem crate:" Dist. Democrats. Republicans.

1. Abram P. Hyde,
2. James E. Eug ish,
3. Wm M. Converse,
4. Geo C Woodruff,

Republicans.
Henry C Deming,
S muel L. Warner,
Augustus Brandege
John H. Hubbard.

The Republican maj city in the State at the last election was upwards of nine thousand votes. We have the foilowing telegraphic reports from the election of yesterday, showing that the Republicans have now carried the S ate by three thousand majority;

HARTFORD, APRIL 6, 10 P. M -- The Republicans carry the State, and elect Henry C. Deming to Congress from the first district.

the first district.

New London gives Buckingham (Republican) for Governor 343 mejority. Colchester gives bim 52, Waterford 28, Windnam 249. Groton 100, Stonington 165. There are heavy Union gains in all the towns as yet heard from in this section of the State.

New Haven gives Seymour (Democrat) for Governor 243 mains to

New Haven gives Seymour (Democrat) for Governous 243 mejor.ty. Fourteen towns in New Haven county, namely, New Haven, Orange, North Branford, Woodbridge, Naugatuck, Hamden, North Haven, Derby, East Haven, Malison, Seymour, Cheshire, Wallingford, and Meriden give 427 mejority, a gain of 394 to Buckingham over 1860, when he carried the Sate over Seymour by

ed by Governor Buckingham, is elected by three thousand majority, Messra Deming, Hubbard, and Brandegee, (Union,) and English (Democrat) are elected to Congress.
The Union men have fifteen out of twenty-one Senature and a large majority in the House.

ANOTHER REPORT OF GEN. McCLELLAN. OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLES OF SOUTH MOUNTAIN AND ANTIETAM.

The Republican of last evening publishes, "as furnished y the Government," the following official report from Gen McCLELLAN, beginning with the evacuation of Harrison's anding, and covering his operations in reaching Aquicreek and Alexandria; his resumption of the command o the forces after the failure of Gen Pope, and his operations in Maryland, including the battles of South Mountain and Antietam. It is important and interesting, being the only official account of those bloody battles yet published

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, October 15, 1862

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit a pr-liminary reort of the military operations under my charge since the vacuation of Harrison's Landing.

The measure, directed by the General-in-Chief, was exe

outed successfully, with entire safety to my command its material, between the 14th and 19th of August. its material, between the 14th and 19th of August. Thine of withdrawal selected was that of the mouth of the Chickahominy, Williamsburg, and Yorktown. Upon this line the main body of the army, with all its trains, was moved, Heintzelman's corps crossing the Chickahominy at Jones's bridge, and covering by its march the movement of the main column. The passage of the Lower Chickahominy was effected by means of a batteau bridge two thousand fret in length. The transfer of the army to York town was completed by the 19th of August. The embarkation of the troops and material at Yorktown and Fortress Monroe was at once commenced, and as rapidly as the means of roe was at once commenced, and as rapidly as the means of transportation admitted every thing was sent forward to Aquia creek and Alexandris. No mere sketch of an under-taking of such magnitude and yet so delicate a military charac-ter will suffice to do justice. I must now, however, content ter will suffice to do justice. I must now, however, content myself with a simple notice of it, deferring a full description for my official report of the campaign before Richmond—a labor which I propose to undertake as soon as events will afford me the necessary time. Justice to the achievements of the Army of the Potomac, and the brave men who composed it, requires that the official record of that campaign should be prepared with more care than circumstances have hitherto premitted me to be the campaign. cances have hitherto permitted me to be tow upon it. The lelay will not have been felt as injurious to the public interest, masmuch as by frequent reports from time to time I have kept the Department advised of events as they oc-

I reached Aquia Creek with my staff on the 24th of Au gust, reported my arrival, and asked for orders. On the 27th of August I received from the General-in-Chief per-mission to proceed to Alexandria, where I at once fixed my headquarters. The troops composing the Army of the Potomac were meanwhile ordered forward to reinforce the army under Gen. Pope. So completely was this order carried out that on the 30th of August I had remainin under my command only a camp guard of about one hun-dred men. Every thing else had been sent to reinforce Gen. Pope. In addition, I exhausted all the means at my diepesal to forward supplies to that officer, my own head-quarter teams even being used for that purpose.

Quarter teams even being used for that purpose.

Upon the unfortunate issue of that campa go I received an intimation from the General-in-Chief that my services were desired for the purpose of a ranging for the defence of the capital. They were at once cheerfully given, although, while awsiting definite instructions at Al-xandris, I had endeavored, as just seen, to promote a favorable result in the operations then pending, and had thus con ributed, though indirectly, yet as far as I could, to the defence of Washington. On the 2d of September the formal order of the War Department placed me is command of the fortifications of Washington "and of all the trops for the de ence of the capital." On the 1st of September I had been instructed that I had nothing to do with the trops engaged in active operations under Gen. Pope, but that my command was limited to the immediate garrison of Washington. On the next day, however, I was verbally instructed by the President and the General in-Chief to assume command of Gen. Pope's troops (including my own Army of the Potomac) as soon as they approached the vicinity of Washington, to go out and meet them, and to post them as I deemed best to repulse the enemy and proposed to the safety of the allow the safety of the allow the safety of the allow the safety of order of the War Department placed me is command of the fortifications of Washington "and of all the troops for to pos them as I deemed best to repulse the enemy and insure the safety of the city.

At this time the task imposed upon me was limited to

the dispositions necessary to resist a direct attack of the enemy upon the capital. Such, indeed, was the danger naturally indicated by the defeat of our forces in front. The wavious garrisons were at once strengthened and put in order, and the troops were disposed to cover all the approaches to the city, and so as to be readily thrown upon approaches to the city, and so as to be readily thrown upon threatened points. New defences were thrown up where deemed necessary. A few days only had elapsed before comparative security was felt with regard to our ability to resist any attack upon the city. The disappearance of the enemy from the front of Washington and their passage into Maryland enlarged the sphere of operations, and made an active campaign necessary to cover Baltimore, prevent the invasion of Pennsylvanis, and drive them out of Maryland. Being honored with the charge of this campaign, I entered at once upon the additional duties imposed upon me with the cherge of this campaign, I entered at once upon the additional duties imposed upon me with the responsibilities thus assumed, and being deeply impressed with the magnitude of the issues involved.

Having made the necessary atrangements for the design the weight of the responsibilities thus assumed, and being deeply impressed with the magnitude of the issues involved.

Having made the necessary atrangements for the design the weight of the responsibilities thus assumed, and being deeply impressed with the magnitude of the issues involved.

Having made the necessary atrangements for the design that the transfer of the enemy, which duties in the afternoon advanced upon the centre of the enemy's position on the main road. Deploying his brigade, Gibbon actively engaged a superior force of the enemy, which, though stubbornly resisting when Gibbon remained in undisturbed possession of the field. He was then relieved by a brigade of Sedgwick's division, late in the afternoon advanced upon the centre of the enemy's position on the main road. Deploying his brigade, Gibbon actively engaged a superior force of the enemy, which, though stubbornly resisting when Gibbon remained in undisturbed possession of the field. He was then relieved by a brigade of Sedgwick's division, late in the afternoon advanced upon the centre of the enemy's position on the main road. Deploying his brigade, of Hatch's division,

Having made the necessary arrangements for the deence of the ci y in the new condition of things, I pushed orward the lat and 9th corps, under Genera's K-no and Hooker, forming the right wing under General Burneide, to Lessburg on the 5th instant; thence the lat c rps, by brooksvile, Cookesville, and Ridgeville, to Frederick, and the 9-h corps, by Damuscus, on New Marke: and Fre-derick. The 2d and 11th corps, under General Summer timately following and supporting the 6th corps. The object of these movem-ns was to feel the enemy—to compel him to develop his intentions—at the same time that the troops were in position resulty to cover Baltimore or Washington, to attack him should be hold the line of the Washington, to attack him should be hold the line of the Mon-cacy, or to follow him into Pennsylvania if necessary. On the 12th a portion of the right wing entered Frederick, after a brisk skirmish at the outskirts of the city and in its streets. On the 13th the main bodies of the right wing and centre passed through Frederica. In this city the manifestations of Union feeling were abundant and gratifying. The troops received the most en hurisatic we leave at the hands of the inhabitants. On the 13th the advance constitute of Passanton's cavaler and here artisdvance, consi-ting of Piersanton's cavalry and horse artil- fact. over the Catoctin hills, leaving no serious obstruction to the movement of the main body until the base of the South Mountain range was reaghed. While at Frederick, on the 13th, I obtained reliable in-

formation of the movements and intentions of the enemy, which made it clear that it was necessary to force the pas-

which made it clear that it was necessary to force the pas-sage of the South Mountain range and gain possession of Boonsboro and Robrersville before any relief could be afforded to Harper's Ferry.

On the morning of the 13th I received a verbal message from Coll. Miles, commanding at Harper's Ferry, informing me that on the preceding afternoon the Maryland heights had been abandoned, after repelling an attack by the robels, and that the whole force was concentrated at Harper's Ferry, the Maryland, Loudoun, and Bolivar Heights being all in rose sage of the enemy. The messagers stated that all in posse saion of the enemy. The messenger stated that there was no apparent reason for the abandonment of the Maryland Heights, and that, though Col. M les asked for assistance, he said he could hold out certainly two days. I directed him to make his way back, if possible, with the information that I was rapidly approaching, and would undoubtedly relieve the place. By three other couriers I sent the same message, with orders to hold out to the last. I do not learn that any of these messagers succeeded in reaching Harper's Ferry. I should here state that on the 12th I was directed to assume command of the participant. reaching Harper's Ferry. I should here state that on the 12th I was direc'ed to assume command of the garrison at Harper's Ferry, but this order reached me after all communication with the garrison was cut off B-fore I left Washington, and while it was jet time, I recommended to the proper suthorities that the garrison at Harper's Ferry should be withdrawn, via Hagerstown, to aid in covering the Cumberland Valley, or that, taking up the pontoon bridge and obstructing the railroad bridge, it should tall back to the Maryland Heights, and there hold their own to the last. In this position it could have maints ned itself back to the Maryland Heights, and there hold their own to the last. In this position it could have mainta ned itself for weeks. It was not deemed proper to adopt either of these suggestions, and when the subject was left to my discretion it was too late to do any thing except to by to

lieve the garrison.

I directed artillery to be frequent'y fired by our advaned guards as a signal to the garrison that relief was at hand.

This was done, and I learn that our firing was distinctly heard at Harper's Ferry, and that they were thus made

aware that we were approaching rapidly. It was confidently expected that this place could hold out until we had carried the mountains and were in a position to make a detachment for its relief. The left, therefore, was ordered to move through Jefferson to the South Mountains, at Crampton's Pass, in front of Burkettaville, while the centre and right moved upon the main or Turner's Pass, in front of Middletown. During these movements I had not imposed long marches on the columns. The absolute necessity of refitting and giving some little rest to troops worn down by previous long continued marching and sovere fighting, together with the uncertainty as to the actual position, strength, and intentions of the enemy, rendered it incum-

down by previous long continued marching and severe nighting, together with the uncertainty as to the actual position, strength, and intentions of the enemy, rend-red it incumbent upon me to move slowly and cautiously until the head-quarters reached Urbans, where I first obtained reliable aformation that the enemy's object was to move upon Harper's Ferry and the Cumberland Valley, and not upon Baltimore, Washington, or Gettysburg.

In the absence of the full reports of corps commanders, a simple outline of the brilliant operations which resulted in the carrying of the two passes through the South Mountains is all that can, at this time, with justice to the troops and commanders engaged, be furnished. The South Mountain range, near Turner's Pass, averages perhaps a thousand feet in height, and forms a strong natural military bartier. The practicable passes are not numerous, and are readily defensible, the gaps abounding in fine positions. Turner's Pass is the more prominent, being that by which the national road crosses the mountains. It was necessarily indicated as the route of advance of our main army.

The carrying of Crampton's Pass, some five or six miles below, was also important to furoish the means of reaching the flank of the enemy, and having, as a lateral movement, direct relations to the attack on the principal pass, while it at the same time presented the most direct practicable route for the reliable of Harney's Farry.

while it at the same time presented the most direct practicable route for the relief of Harper's Ferry.

Early in the morning of the 14 h Gen. Pleasanton, with a

Early in the morning of the 14 h Gen. Pleasanton, with a cavalry force, reconnoitered the position of the enemy, whom he discovered to occupy the crests of commanding hills at the gap on either side of the national road, and upon adventageous ground in the centre upon and near the road, with artillery bearing upon all the approaches to their position, whether that by the main road or those by the country roads which led around up to the crest upon the right and left. At about 8 o'clock A. M. Cox's division of Reno's corps, a portion of Burnade's column, in co-operation with the reconnoissance, which by this time had become an attack, moved up the mountain by the old Sharpsburg road to the left of the main road, dividing as they advanced into two columns. These columns as they advanced into two columns. These columns (Scammon's and Cook's brigades) handsomely carried the enemy's position on the creat in their front, which gave us possession of an important point for further operations. Fresh bodies of the enemy now appearing, Cox's position. though held stubbornly, became critical, and between 12 and 1 o'clock P. M. Wilcox's division, of Reno's corps was sent forward by Gen. Burnside to support Cox, and between 2 and 3 P. M. Sturgie's division was sent up. The contest was maintained with perseverance until dark, the enemy having the advantage as to position, and ighting with obstinacy: but the ground won was fully naintained The loss in killed and wounded here was conral Reno, who had gone forward to observe the operat his corps, and to give such directions as were necessaand distinguished officer tempered with sadness the exulta-tions of trumph. A gallant soldier, an able General, en-d ared to his troops and associates, his death is felt as an

reparable misfortune.

About 3 o'clock P. M., Hooker's corps, of Burnside's column, moved up to the right of the main road by a country road, which, bending to the right, then turning up to the left, circuitously wound its way beyond the crest of the pass to the Mountain House, on the main road Gen Hooker sent Meade, with the division of Pennaylvania re-

Rickett's division pressed up the mountain about five M., arriving at the crest with the left of his command in time to participate in the closing scene of the engag-ment. Relieving Hatch's division, Ricketts remained on the ground, holding the battle-field during the night.

In the engagem at at Turner's Pass our loss was three hundred and twenty-eight k l'ed, and one thousand four hundred and fixty-t-ree wounded and missing; that of the enemy is estimated to be, in all, about three thousand Among our wounded, I regret to say, were Brigadier Gen-

eral J. P. Hatch and other valuable officers.

The carrying of Crampton's Pass by Franklin was exe derick. The 2d and 11th corps, under Generals Sumar and Williams, on the 6th were moved from T-nallytown to Rockville, thence by Middlebury and Urbana on Frederick, thence by Middlebury and Urbana on Frederick, the 11th corps moving by a lateral road between Urbana and New Market, thus maintaining the communication between the centre and right wing, as well as covering the direct route from Frederick to Washington. The 6th corps, under General Franklin, was moved to Darnestown on the 6th instant, thence by Dawsonville and Barnville on Buckey-town, covering the road from the mouth of the Monocacy to Rockville, and being in position to connect with and support the centre, should it have been necessary (as was supposed) to force the line of the Monocacy. Couch's division was thrown forward to Offut's Cross-Roads and Poolesville by the river road, thus covering that approach, watching the fords of the Potomac, and ultimately tollowing and supporting the 6th corps. The object of these movements are more than a contract of these movements are supposed to the potential of the road Brooks's and Irwin's brigades, of Smith's division, formed for the protection of Socum's darket, thence of the Rotory and the contract was gained, and the composition of these movements are protected by a stone wall, and steadily forced back up the mountain until they reached the position of their battery near the road, well up the mountain. Here they made a stand, They were, however, driven back, retiring their artillery in chelos, until, af er an action of three hours, the creet was gained, and the composition of the road Brooks's and Irwin's brigades, of Smith's division, formed for the protection of Socum's diank, charged up the mountain in the courts of Socum's diank, charged up the mountain in the courts of Socum's diank, charged up the mountain in the society of these movements of the society of these movements. On the left of the road Brooks and I win's brigades, of Smith's division, formed for the protection of Socum's flank, charged up the mountain in the same steady manner, driving the enemy before them until the creat was carried. The loss in Franklin's corps was one hundred and fitteen ki led, four hundred and sixteen wounded, and two missing. The enemy's loss was about the same. One piece of artillery and four colors were captured, and knapsacks, and even haverancks, were abandoned as the enemy were driven up the bill.

On the morning of the 15th I was informed by Union civilians living on the side of the mountains that the enemy were retreating in the greatest baste and in disordered were retreating in the greatest baste and in disordered masses to the river. There was such a concurrence of tertimony on this point that there seemed no doubt as to the fact. The has y retreat of the enemy's forces from the mountain, and the withdrawal of the remaining troops from between Boomsboro' and Hagerstown to a position where they could resist a tack and cover the Shepherdstown ford, and receive the reinforcements expected from Harper's Ferry, were for a time interpreted as evidences of the enemy's disorganization and demoralization.

As soon as it was definitely known that the enemy had abandoned the mountains, the cavalry and the corps of Sumner, Hooker, and Manefield were ordered to pursue them, via the turnpike and Boonsboro,' as promptly as pos-

them, via the turnpike and Boonsboro, as promptly as possible. The corps of Burneide and Porter (the latter hav ing but one weak division present) were ordered to move by the old Sharpsburg road, and Franklin to advance in: Peasant Valley, occupy Rohrersville, and to endeavor to elieve Harper's Ferry. Burnside and Porter, upon reaching the road from Boonsboro' to Robrersville, were to re-inforce Franklin or to move on Sharpsburg, according to circumstances. Franklin moved towards Brown-ville, and found there a force largely superior in numbers to his own, drawn up in a strong position to receive him. Here the total exaction total cessation of firing is the direction of Harper's Ferry indicated but too clearly the shameful and premature sur-

render of that post.

The cavalry advance overtook a body of the enemy's cav alty at Boonsboro', which it dispersed after a brief skir-mish, killing and wounding many, taking some two hun-dred and fifty prisoners and two guns.

Richardson's division, of Sumner's corps, passing Boons-boro' to Kedysville, tound a few miles beyond the town the enemy's forces, displayed in line of battle, strong both in

enemy's forces, displayed in line of battle, strong both in respect to numbers and position, and awaiting attack. Upon receiving reports of the disposition of the enemy, I derected all the corps, except that of Franklin, upon Sharpsburg, leaving Franklin to observe and check the enemy in his front, and avail himself of any chance that might off r. I had hoped to come up with the enemy, during the 15th, in sufficient force to beat them again, and during the 15th, in sufficient force to best them again, and drive them tels the fiver. My instructions were, that if the enemy were noten the march they were to be at once attacked; if they were found in force and position, the corps were to be placed in position for attack, but no attack was to be used until I reached the front.

On arriving at the front is the afternoon, found but two divisions, Richardson's and Sykes's, to position: the

rest were halted in the road, the head of the column some rest were halted in the road, the head of the column some distance in the rear of Richardson. After a rapid examination of the position, I found that it was too late to attack that day, and at once directed locations to be selected for our batteries of position, and indicated the bivouacs for the different corps, massing them near and on both sides of the Sharpsburg pike. The corps were not all in their places until the next morning, some time after sunrise.

On the 16th the enemy had slightly changed their line, and were posted upon the Heights in rear of the Antietam creek, their left and centre being upon and in front of the road from Sharpsburg to Hagerstown, and protected by

road from Sharpsburg to Hagerstown, and protected by woods and irregularities of the ground. Their extreme left rested upon a wooded eminence near the cross-roads to the north of J. Miller's farm, the distance at this point between the road and the Potomac, which makes here a great bend to the east, being about three fourths of a mile. Their right rested on the hills to the right of Sharpsburg, near Snavely's farm, covering the crossing of the Antietan and the approaches to the town from the coutheast. The tween their immediate front and the Antiet

ground between their immediate front and the Antietam is undulating. Hills intervene whose crests in general are commanded by the crests of others in their rear. On all favorable points their artillery was posted. It became evident, from the force of the enemy and the strength of their position, that desperate fighting alone could drive them from the field, and all felt that a great and terrible attle was at hand.

In proceeding to the narrative of the events of this and the succeeding day, I must here repeat what I have observed in reporting upon the other subjects of this communication, that I attempt in this preliminary report nothing more than a sk-tch of the main features of this great engagement, reserving for my official report, based upon the reports of the corps commanders, that full description of details which shall place upon record the achievements of individuals and of particular bodies of troops. The de-sign was to make the main attack upon the enemy's left— at least, to create a diversion in favor of the main attack, with the hope of something more—by assailing the enemy's right, and as soon as one or both of the flank movements were fully successful, to attack their centre with any re-serve I might then have on hand. serve I might then have on band.

The morning of the 16th (during which there was conderable artillery firing) was epent in obtaining information as to the ground, rectifying the position of the troops, and perfecting the arrangements for the attack.

On the afternoon of the 16th Hooker's corns On the afternoon of the 16th Hooker's corps, consisting of Ricketts' and Doubleday's divisions, and the Pennsylvania Reserves, under Meade, was sent across the Antictam creek, by a ford and bridge to the right of Kedysville, with orders to attack, and, if possible, turn the enemy's left Mansfield, with his corps, was sent in the evening to support Hooker. Arrived in position, Meade's division of the Pennsylvania Reserves, which was at the head of Hooker's corps, became engaged in a sharp contest with the enemy, which lasted until after dark, when it succeeded in driving in a portion of the opposing line, and held the ground.

At daylight the contest was renewed between Hooker ful for a time, but masses of the enemy, thrown upon his corps, checked it. Mansfield brought up his corps to Hook er's support, when the two corps drave the enemy back the gallant and distinguished veteran Mansfield losing hi li'e in the effort. Gen. Hooker was, unbappily, about this time wounded, and compelled to leave the field, where his services had been conspicuous and important. About an hour after this time Summer's corps, consisting of Sedg-wick's, Richardsou's, and French's divisions, arrived on he field-Richardson some time after the other two, as

Sedgwick, on the right, penetrated the woods in front of Hooker's and Man field's troops. French and Richardson were placed to the left of Sedgwick, thus at tacking the enemy towards their left centre. Crawford's and Sedgwick's times, however, yielded to a destructive fire of masses of the enemy in the woods, and, suffering greatly—Gens. Sedgwick and Crawford being among the wounded—their troops fell back in disorder: they neverwounded—their troops fell back in disorder; they nevertheless rallied in the woods. The enemy's advance was, however, entirely checked by the destructive fire of our artiflery. Franklin, who had been directed the day before to join the main army with two divisions, arrived on the field from Brownsville about an hour after, and Smith's division replaced Sedgwick's and Crawford's line. Advancing steadily, it swept over the ground just lost, but now permanently retaken. The divisions of French and Richardson maintained with considerable loss the exposed positions which they had so gallantly gained. mong the wounded being Gen. Richardson

The condition of things on the right, towards the middle of the afternoon, notwithstanding the success wrested from the enemy by the stubborn bravery of the troops, compelled to draw two brigades from Porter's corps (the reserve) to strengthen the right. This left for the reserve the small division of regulars who had been engaged in supporting during the day the batteries in the centre and a single brigade of Morell's division. Before I left the right to return to the centre, I became astisfied that the line would be held without these two brigades, and counter-manded the order, which was in the course of execution. The eff ct of Burnside's movement on the enemy's right

was to prevent the further massing of their troops on their left, and we held what we had gained.

Burnsi e's corps, consisting of Wilcox's, Sturgis's, and Rodman's divisions, and Cox's Kanawh, division, was entrusted with the difficult task of carrying the bridge across the Antietam, in ar Robrback's farm, and assaulting the enemy's right, the order having been communicated to him

The valley of the Aureusm at an arrow, with high banks. On the right of the stream the approaches both to bank is wooded, and commands the approaches both to the bridge and the ford. The steep slopes of the bank were liged with rifle pits and breastworks of rails and stones. There, together with the woods, were filled with the enemy's intentry, while their batteries completely com-manded and enfilled the bridge and ford and their ap-The sidvance of the troops brought on an obstinate and

sanguinary contest, and from the great natural advantages of the position, it was nearly one o'clock before the heights on the right bank were carried. At about three o'clock P. M. the corps again advanced, and with succes the right driving the enemy before it and pushing of pearly to Sharpaburg, while the left, after a hard encounter also compelled the enemy to retire before it. The enemy here, however, were speedily reinforced, and with over whelming masses. New batteries of their artillery, also were brought up and opened. It become evident that our force was it sufficient to enable the advance to reach the town, and the order was given to retire to be cover of the hill, which was taken from the enemy earlier in the attenuou. I his movement was effected without confusion, and the position maintained until the enemy retreated. Gen. Burn-ide had sent to me for reinforcements late in the afternoon, but the condition of things on the right was not such as to enable me to afford them.

During the whole day our artill ry was every where bravely and ably handled. Indeed, I cannot speak to highly of the efficiency of our batteries, and of the great service they rendered. On more than one occasion, when our intantry was broken, they covered its reformation and drove heat the amount.

drove back the enemy.

The cavalry had fittle field for operations during the en ragement, but was employed in supporting the horse artilery batteries in the centre, and in driving up stragglers

lery batteries in the centre, and in driving up straggiers, while awaiting opportunity for other service.

The signal corps, under Major Myer, readered during the operations at Antietsm, as at South Mountain, and during the whole movements of the army, efficient and valuable service. Indeed, by its services here, as on other fields elsewhere, this corps has gillantly earned its title to an in-

dependent and permanent organization.
The duties devolving upon my staff during the action were most important, and the performances of them able and untiring. At a later day I propose to bring to the notice of the Department their individual services.
With the day closed this memorable battle, in which,

perhaps, nearly two hundred thousand men were for four-teen hours engaged in combat. We had attacked the ene-my in position, driven them from the line on one dank, and s cured a foo ing within it on the other. Under the de pression of previous reverses, we had achieved a victor; over an adversary invested with the prestige of former successes and inflated with a recent triumph. Our force slept that night conquerors on a field won by their valor and covered with the dead and wounded of the enemy.

The night, however, presented serious questions; mo ing brought with it grave responsibilities. To renew thattack again on the 18th, or to defer it, with the chance of the enemy's retirement after a day of suspense, were the questions before me. A careful and anxious survey the questions before me. A careful and anxious survey of the condition of my command, and my knowledge of the enemy's force and position, failed to impress me with any reasonable certainty of success if I renewed the attack without reinforcing columns. A view of the shattered state of some of the corps sufficed to deter me from pressing them into immediate action, and I felt that my duty to the army and the country forbade the risks involved in a basty in venent, which might result in the lass of what had been gained the previous day. Impelled by this consideration, I awaited the arrival of my reinforcements, taking advantage of the occasion to collect together the dispersed, give rest to the fatigued, and remove the wound-

ed. Of the reinforcements, Couch's division, although marching with commendable rapidity, was not in position until a late hour in the morning; and Humphrey's division of new troops, fatigued with forced marches, were arriving throughout the day, but were not available until near its close. Large reinforcements from Pennsylvania, which were expected during the day, did not arrive at all.

During the 18th orders were given for a renewal of the attack at daylight on the 19th. On the night of the 18th the enemy, after having been passing troops in the latter part of the day from the Virginia shore to their position behind Sharpsburg, as seen by our officers, suddenly formed the design of abandoning their line. This movement they executed before daylight. Being but a short distance from the river, the evacuation presented but little difficulty. It was, however, rapidly followed up.

A reconnecisance was made across the river on the evening of the 19th, which resulted in ascertaining the near presence of the enemy in some force, and in our capturing six

ing of the 19th, which resulted in ascertaining the near presence of the enemy in some force, and in our capturing six guns. A second reconnoiseance, the next morning, which, with the first, was made by a small detachment from Porter's corps, resulted in observing a heavy force of the enemy there. The detachment withdrew with slight loss. I gubmit herewith a last of the killed, wounded, and missing in the engagements of the 15th, and of the 16th and 17th. The enemy's loss is believed, from the best sources of information, to be nearly thirty thousand. Their dead were mostly lett on the field, and a large number of wounded were left behind.

While it gives me pl asure to speak of the gallantry and devotion of officers and men, generally displayed through this conflict, I feel it necessary to mention that some officers and men skulked from their places in the ranks until the battle was over. Death on the spot must hereafter be

the battle was over. Death on the spot must hereafter be the fate of all such cowards, and the hands of the military commanders must be strengthened with all the power of the Government to inflict it summarily.

The early and disgraceful surrender of Harper's Ferry description of the control of the contro

The early and disgraceful surrender of marper's rerry deprived my operations of results which would have formed a brilliant sequence to the substantial and gratifying success already related. Had the garrison held outbut twenty-four hours longer, I should, in all probability, have captured to the standard of the surrender of th tured that part of the enemy's force engaged in the attack on the Maryland Heights, while the whole garrism, some twelve thousand strong, could have been drawn to reinforce me on the day of the decisive battle—ce tainly on the morning of the 18th. I would thus have been in a position to have destroyed the rebellarmy. Under the same cir-cumstances, had the besieging force on the Virgina side at Harper's Ferry not been withdrawn, I would have had thirty five or forty thousand less men to encounter at Anistam, and must have expured or destroyed all opposed to me. As it was, I had to engage an army fresh from a recent, and to them a great victory, and to reap the disadvantages of their being freshly and plentifully supplied

with ammunition and supplies.

The o'j ct and results of this brief campaign may be summed up as follows: In the beginning of the month of September the salety of the national capital was reriously endangered by the presence of a victorious enemy, who soon after crossed into Maryland, and then directly threat-ened Washington and Bultimore, while they occupied the soil of a loyal State, and threatened an invasion of Penn-sylvania. The army of the Union, inferior in numbers, wearned by long marches, deficient in various supplies, worn out by numerous battles, the last of which had not been successful, first covered by its movements the impor-tant c ties of Washington and Baltimore, then boldly at-tacked the victorious enemy in their chosen strong posi-tion, and drove them back, with all their superiority of numbers, into the State of Virginia; thus saving the loyal States from invasion, and rudely dispelling the rebel dreams of carrying the war into our country and subsisting upon our resources. Thirteen guns and thirty-nine colors, more than fifteen thousand stand of small arms, and more than six thousand prisoners, were the trophies which attest the

success of our arms. Rendering thanks to Divine Providence for its blessing upon our exertions, I close this brief report. I beg only to add the hope that the army's efforts for the cause in which we are engaged will be deemed worthy to receive the commendation of the Government and the country.

I am, very respectfully, your ob-dient servant, GEG. B. McCLELLAN, Major General U. S. Army.
Brigadier General L. Thomas,

Adjutant General U. S. Army.

OUR PARIS CORRESPONDENCE. PARIS, FRIDAY, MARCH 20TH, 1863. Of all the festivities which have celebrated the event of to the donor and to the Prince himself as that which took place at Nice under the auspices of an American citizen. It is impossible. I should think, for any coun ryman of Mr. Peabody to hear or read of that tête and its details with. out feeling proud of their fellow citizen and of the land which produces such individuals. The splendor and generosity with which the thing was done were in fact the least part of it; for uo one expects less than that of Mr. Peabody who has ever either shared his splendid hospitality or heard (and who has not heard) of his boundless charity. What is most striking in the incident of which I speak is its enlarged benevolence; which sears far above the regions of individual or even national ill-will against an elder and a parent nation, and thinks only of the young boy, who, acting under the wise guidance of his illustrious father, was the first of his race to teek the shore of America-the first to stand uncovered before the tomb of Washington, since the great events of 1776. This was the Prince of Wales, and this was the noble sentiment which inspired an American citizen to celebrate by a truly international banquet, can occasion diguified quite as much by the hitherto unsul-lied youth and reputations of the principal parties, as by the virtues, on both sides, of their progenitors, as by their own high station and prospects in this world. The inspi-ration was indeed noble, and breathes the spirit of the loft-

ration was indeed noble, and breathes the spirit of the loftest charity and good will, especially at a moment and under circumstances like the present. Let us hope that such a demonstration of kindly feeing to the young son will pour one more drop of consolaton into the bitter cup of the n ble lady who ceases not to mourn the loss of one of the most apright and honorable among men.

Description, mere description, can convey little notions of the intrinsic quality of a festivity of which the real value lies so much desper than mere outside gaud and tinsel I shall, therefore, attempt little more than to record the fact that Mr. Peabody being at Nice for his health, (which has greatly benefitted by his sojourn there,) gave a truly magnificent entertainme t in the long room of the Grande-Breigne Hotel to all the chief English, American, and French visiters and residents, in celebration of the marriage of the English Prince. To make the thing more complete and unique, the vererable Lord Brougham, now in riage of the English Prince. To make the thing more complete and unique, the venerable Local Broundsm, now in his eighty-fifth year, came over from Canmato Join the party and testify his respect and esteem for the donor. The chief speeches delivered were those of the Duke of riamilion in giving the health of the Emperor of the French; of the Prefect of the Maitime Alps on giving that of Queen Victoria, "as Queen, wife, and mother;" of the Marquis of Headfort on giving that of the Presidint of the United State; and last, though not least, of Mr Peabody on giving the toast of the day, the health of the Prince of Wales and his young bride. Then came, of a far warmer and less official character, the health of Mr Peabody himself by Lord Brougham, who came there, he said, "to testify his Lord Br. ugham, who came there, he said, "to testify his profound respect and heartfelt gratitude towards so great a public benefactor," one who "stood at the head of that class to which belong such men as Sir W m. Brown, of Liverpold, Sir F ancis Crossley, of Halifax, and Sir James Baxter, of Dundee: a class whose large and wise benefit cence and won the respect and gratitude of the whole world."

Mr. Prabody had intended to give a concert to conclude the evening but yielded to a bail, which included still greater numbers, and partook entirely of an international

How much pleasauter are such scenes to describe than the trickery of rival politicians and parties! Thave scarcely heart in this letter to rush back into the turbid stream of current events. A debate of great animation and even of some violence in the Senate on the petitions in favor of Poland has just closed by a vote of the "order of the day. Prince Napoleon spoke at great length, urging the Government to extreme measures. But he was well replied to by M Billault, who processed that the Government was full of sympathy for Poland, and would do all in its power to aid her, short of throwing Europe into convulsions.

A CONFEDERATE STATES BANK.

A preliminary prospectus (without any name being attached) of " The London and Confederate States Bank" la published in the London journals. The capital is fixed at £2,000,000 sterl ng. The prospectus points out the certainty of the ultimate recognition of the Southern States. and the desirability of baving banking facilities ready for